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Scandinavian philosopher Alf Ross once wrote about the imagi-
nary research of an anthropologist among a tribe on a South Pacific
Island.1 The tribe believed that in violating certain taboos, for exam-
ple, eating the food prepared for the chief, there occurs a "tct-til"; the
person who committed the infringement also becomes "tft-tft," subject
to a purification ceremony. "Tft-tft," although it lacks intrinsic mean-
ing, functioned in the people's daily language to express rules and to
make assertions about facts.2 The concept of impermissible discrimina-
tion is as elusive as "tti-tfi." Discrimination is difficult to define, ob-
serve, and prove. Like "tf-t0," it may have no intrinsic meaning at all;
rather, it acquires meaning in the context of a larger whole.
A main teaching of the United States Supreme Court's decisions
on the permissibility of affirmative action plans, Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke3 and United Steelworkers v. Weber,4 is that
the 1964 civil rights legislation s was written without much thought of
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1. Ross, TD-TD, 70 HARv. L. Rnv. 812 (1957).
2. Ross cautions against reifying the idea of "tQ-tti" His point is that the legal con-
cept of "rights, duties, or ownership" is a "tool for the technique of presentation serving
exclusively systematic ends, and that in itself it means no more and no less than does 'tit-
tft.'" Id at 825.
3. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, 243-268, 42 U.S.C.
what discrimination was. The 1964 Act, like other federal civil rights
statutes,6 does not define discrimination. This omission is understanda-
ble viewed from the social context of the 1960's when society's aware-
ness of discrimination focused on the purposeful, inferior treatment of
blacks. The word "discrimination" does not appear in the fifth or four-
teenth amendments of the United States Constitution. This lack of def-
inition in the Constitution and statutes has hindered conceptual
development and created confusion among lawyers, litigants, and
courts.7 These difficulties are compounded by uncertainty about what
social policy discrimination laws reflect. 8
Even if consensus on the definition of discrimination existed, prov-
ing discrimination would remain difficult because of the concealed na-
ture of most discriminatory acts. Direct evidence of discriminatory
motivation is seldom available, so claimants often rely on indirect or
circumstantial evidence showing differences in treatment for minority9
and majority group members or showing that the impact of an act
bears more heavily on minority group members than on the majority.
Even the fact that there are differences in group treatment may be, at
least initially, difficult to establish, although some researchers have de-
veloped sophisticated statistical techniques to identify these differ-
ences.10 Litigants, however, may be unfamiliar with such techniques or
lack the data to use them at trial. As a result, courts often decide dis-
§§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1976). Title II deals with public accommodation, title IV with school
desegregation, title VI with recipients of federal financial assistance, and title VII with
employment.
6. E.g., title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1976)
(housing); title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976)
(gender discrimination in educational institutions); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982 (1976).
7. For example, the meaning of Bakke and Weber is still being debated. See, e.g.,
Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Harris,
444 U.S. 130 (1979); Note, Intent or Impact: Proving Discrimination Under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1095 (1982); Note, Discrimination and Affirmative
Action: 4n 4nalysis of Competing Theories and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REv. 531 (1981). See infra
text accompanying note 168.
8. The clearest dichotomy is between imposing affirmative obligations to ensure equal
achievement by blacks and women and imposing an obligation merely not to injure. Com-
pare Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Em-
ployment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972) with Fiss,A Theory ofFair Employment
Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235 (1971). See also Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977). See infra text accompanying notes
167-70.
9. For convenience we use the term "minority group" for any social or political mi-
nority-including women-and do not intend it to denote only numerical minorities.
10. E.g., DISCRIMINATION IN ORGANIZATIONS (R. Alvarez & K. Lutterman eds. 1979);
Duncan, Discrimination Against Negroes, 371 ANNALS 85 (1967).
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crimination cases on the basis of relatively limited statistical evidence.
In some cases similar evidence of differences in treatment or adverse
impact is used not as circumstantial evidence but as direct evidence of
discrimination. Even though its relevance is not disputed, questions
remain concerning the proper form, probative value, and legal conse-
quence of this statistical evidence.
This Article provides an approach to evaluating the use and value
of statistical evidence in discrimination cases in the federal courts. Liti-
gants depend increasingly on social science research techniques" in
presenting or assessing evidence, especially under the disparate impact
definition of discrimination.12 Statistical evidence is often determina-
tive in challenges to racial exclusions from juries,' 3 housing discrimina-
tion,14 voting discrimination,' 5 and employment discrimination. 1
6 It is
therefore important to understand what kind of statistical evidence
constitutes proof of discrimination or enables defendants to rebut such
a charge.
The expanded use of statistics has prompted a growing literature
on the subject, especially in specific areas such as housing, juries, and
employment.' 7 Several recent books elaborate on the nature of statisti-
11. Social science research methods seek empirical regularities including relationships
between variables, often revealed through statistical analysis.
12. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The applicability of this definition
is a major focus of this article. See infra text accompanying notes 82-92.
13. E.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625 (1972).
14. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
908 (1978).
15. Eg., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
16. E.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
In employment cases, statistical evidence is often essential to test validation. See, e.g.,
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295 (1978).
In addition to statistical evidence of racial or gender disparities, litigants may use other
types of statistical evidence or arguments of a statistical nature. For example, Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), involved a request for an injunction of future police misconduct
based on past acts. The issue before the Court, although phrased as a standing question, was
whether a sufficient number of past instances supported the conclusion that police miscon-
duct was likely to occur in the future. Other examples include the variance allowed in com-
plying with the "one-man, one-vote" rule and the validity and effect of multi-member rather
than single-member legislative districts. E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971);
Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts--Do They Violate the "One-Man, One-Vote"
Principle? 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
17. See, e.g., Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Dis-
crimination Cases, 80 HARv. L. REv. 338 (1966) (juries); Fiss, supra note 8 (employnient);
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cal proof for lawyers and for social scientists who assist in discrimina-
tion cases.' s Other scholars describe specific statistical techniques for
proving or rebutting discrimination claims 19 and consider what popula-
tions should be compared in adverse impact cases. 20 This literature ex-
plains specific techniques but rarely explores the more difficult
questions of what constitutes discrimination 2' or the conceptual distinc-
tions between different forms of discrimination. It is not surprising that
disagreement over the appropriate use of statistics has accompanied
this growing literature and case law. For example, a recent exchange
debated whether quantitative evidence should be used only in response
to already articulated legal issues or whether legal concepts of discrimi-
nation should be restricted to ones that can be expressed in statistical
terms.
2 2
Hallock, The Numbers Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23
VILL. L. REV. 5 (1977) (employment); Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Em-
ployee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REV.
1 (1977) (employment); Sperlich & Jaspovice, Methods/or the Analysis ofJury Panel Selec-
tions: Testingfor Discrimination in a Series of Panels, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 787 (1979)
(juries); Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing Acts: A Search
for a Proper Standard, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 398 (1979) (housing); Note, Beyond the Prima
Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 387 (1975) (employment).
18. Eg., D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); W.
CONNOLLY & D. PETERSON, USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
LITIGATION (1980); M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW (1978).
19. Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Mtltiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex
Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 737 (1980); Hallock, supra note 17; Lerner, Em-
ployment Discrimination. Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 17.
20. Lerner, upra note 19; Maltz, The Expansion ofthe Role ofthe Effects Test in Anti-
Discrimination Law: A CriticalAnalysis, 59 NEB. L. REV. 345 (1980); Shoben, supra note 17.
See also infra text accompanying notes 128-36.
21. For example, Lerner, supra note 19, criticizes several recent Supreme Court title
VII decisions for failure to prefer qualified labor force data over applicant or general popu-
lation data and for misuse of validation requirements. At the same time she suggests that
the Court's refusal to apply Grigg's disparate impact theory of discrimination to the constitu-
tional case of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), was whimsical. Thus, she does not
consider why and under what circumstances evidence of impact is or ought to be relevant to
discrimination.
22. Cohn, On The Use ofStatistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 55 IND. L.J.
493 (1980); Cohn, Statistical Laws and the Use of Statistics in Law: A Rejoinder to Professor
Shoben, 55 IND. L.J. 537 (1980); Shoben, In Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis Under
Title VII" A Refply to Dr. Cohn, 55 IND. L.J. 515 (1980).
A different version of a similar debate involves the application of mathematical models
to judicial or jury decisionmaking. See, e.g., Finkestein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identfcation Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1970), critiqued by Tribe, Trial by Mathemat-
ics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971). David Kaye
discusses the relevance of this methodology to discrimination cases in Book Review, 80
MICH. L. REV. 833, 852-55 (1982) (reviewing D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 18). See also
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In spite of the academic debate regarding the use and misuse of
statistics in discrimination cases, no one has adequately defined the
purposes of statistical evidence or related the use of statistical evidence
to alternate conceptions of discrimination. We address these issues by
setting forth a typology of discrimination cases and by describing the
probative value of statistical evidence for each type.
We classify cases in terms of the theoretical basis of the plaintiff's
claim and the utility of statistical evidence for each theory. The classi-
fication proceeds from an understanding of the underlying notions of
harm in discrimination suits. It takes into account whether the alleged
discrimination is intentional and whether it is covert. There are, of
course, other ways to classify types of discriminations depending on the
purpose of the classification or the perspective from which it is derived.
Legal authority (constitution, statute, or executive order), subject mat-
ter (housing, voting, or employment), and chronology are most often
used. However, grouping cases in these ways obscures factual and pol-
icy differences and similarities in all discrimination claims. Each case
of discrimination can be viewed as on a continuum in terms of its reli-
ance on statistical evidence. By looking at cases in terms of this reli-
ance, one can identify, understand, and appreciate what policy choices
are inherent in advocating one conception of discrimination over an-
other. The five kinds of discrimination that form the typology reflect
different resolutions to the policy question of how far to intrude into
individual and government autonomy in order to end discrimination.
Classification of Theoretical Bases For Discrimination Cases
Our typology begins with overt gender and racial classifications,
considers three types of intentional but covert types of discrimination,
and concludes with claims based solely on evidence of differences in
treatment or adverse impact. This scheme has several key features.
First, it proceeds from the plaintiffs' view of how they were harmed at
the hands of the defendant. Thus, it depends on the allegations of the
plaintiffs rather than describing "reality" or applying the "best" theory.
Second, although there is the temptation to do so, we have not let the
kind of evidence that is available, relevant, probative, or actually used
dictate the theories. Instead we looked to the appropriate legal and
policy issues involved. Third, impermissible motive is crucial to sev-
eral of the categories. Because motive may be inferred from vastly dif-
Banzhaf, supra note 16 (author's model measures voting power as the ability to cast a deci-
sive Vote); Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978).
January 1983]
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ferent circumstances, these circumstances play an important part in the
classification scheme. Fourth, cases may belong to more than one theo-
retical category, because plaintiffs may plead in the alternative or make
ambiguous allegations. Also, the use of certain arguments may in effect
transform a case from one theoretical type to another.23 Finally, the
classification scheme includes the form of statistical evidence most ap-
propriate to the plaintiffs' theory of discrimination and to the defend-
ants' rebuttal. Because cases may belong to more than one category,
different kinds of evidence may be appropriate in the same case.
24
Classifying the theoretical bases of discrimination claims is com-
plicated for several reasons. First, the constitutional or statutory nature
of a challenge usually dictates the terminology used in litigation, so
challenges are neither conceived nor presented in a unified theoretical
framework. Second, litigants and courts do not necessarily identify the
theoretical basis of a claim, and the statistical evidence used might not
be particularly appropriate for the theory apparently alleged. A third
problem is linked to the increasing tendency of courts, litigants, and
commentators to distinguish disparate treatment claims from disparate
impact claims. The origin of this distinction may be that disparate
treatment is the traditional conception of discrimination,25 while dispa-
rate impact represents the more recent view that identical or equivalent
treatment of majority and minority group members can have adverse
effects on minorities that are as devastating as unequal treatment.
26
23. See infra text following note 115. Also, one act may be discriminatory in several
ways. For example, a facially neutral law could be enacted with the impermissible motive
that the law will be applied in an uneven manner.
24. Nonexclusivity may cause the confusion observed in various lower court opinions.
Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection With
Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title V11, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 670 (1981), notes a
number of cases in which the courts confound or commingle the theories of disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact, especially in terms of available defenses. Lerner, supra note 19,
at 29, states that few cases with multiple plaintiffs fit exclusively into either category. See
also Shoben, Compound Discrimination: the Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment
Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793 (1980). We suggest that nonexclusivity is not the
problem, but rather that the treatment-impact distinction is.
25. See G. SIMPSON & M. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES (1970);
Yinger, Social Discrimination, in 12 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA Soc. Sci. 448 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
A less flattering possibility is that the distinction is attractive because of its apparent
simplicity. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and McDonnell Douglas v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court outlined the order and allocation of proof
for each type of case in fairly straightforward fashion. If all cases can be labelled treatment
or impact, organizing and evaluating evidence will be easy for litigants and the courts.
26. This view is also based in part on the notion that current disparate impact may
reflect past unequal treatment. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
According to D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 18, at 1 n.3, the treatment-impact dis-
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the Supreme Court distinguished disparate treatment from dispa-
rate impact claims in a case involving title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,27 the primary statutory basis for discrimination claims in employ-
ment. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,28 the
Court defined a disparate treatment claim as one in which the plaintiff
asserts that the defendant intentionally treated some people less favora-
bly than others because of their race or gender. Proof of discriminatory
motive is critical, although sometimes motive can be inferred from dif-
ferences in treatment. 29 To justify gender-based disparate treatment
under title VII, the employer must show that sex is "a bona fide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
[the] particular business .... -30 Under the statute, race cannot be a
bona fide occupational qualification. In contrast to disparate treatment
claims, the disparate impact theory does not require proof of discrimi-
natory motive. Disparate impact claims involve practices ostensibly
race or gender neutral that in actuality fall more harshly on members
of one group than another. Employers may justify the use of such
practices in race or gender cases by showing that the practice actually
serves central business concerns.
31
Distinguishing cases in terms of this dichotomy is not always easy.
Either theory may apply to certain sets of facts; in some instances
neither fits the case very well. In still others, a court, for reasons known
only to it, may rule that a case brought as a disparate impact case
should be analyzed under the disparate treatment theory.32 Under the
tinction originated with B.L. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
(1976). It is used by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252 n.5 (1981), and is now standard in the literature. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Hekeler,
Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: 4 Legal
and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 505 (1980); Friedman, The Burger Court and
the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: 4 Critique, 65 CORNELL L.
Rnv. 1 (1979); Lerner, supra note 19; Shoben, supra note 17; Comment, Judicial Reqnement
of Statistical Evidence in Title VI Cases, 13 CONN. L. REV. 515 (1981); Note, Covert Sex
Discrimination: Evidentiary Burdens Under Title 11 and Section 1983 Compared, 53 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1747 (1980).
27. 42 U.S.C, §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). The Court first enunciated the disparate im-
pact theory in a title VII case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
28. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
29. Id at 335-36 n.15; McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976) (bona fide occupational qualification).
31. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also infra note 93 & accompa-
nying text.
32. For example, in EEOC v. Virginia Chemicals, Inc., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
425 (E.D. Va. 1978), the plaintiffs challenged under title VII an employer's policy of dis-
charging employees with excessive garnishments. Even though the policy was racially neu-
January 1983]
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treatment-impact dichotomy, it is unclear how cases challenging
facially neutral practices allegedly adopted for discriminatory reasons
should be classified. Nor is it clear how to categorize cases challenging
policies affecting only one group where there is no effect on another
similarly situated group, for example, policies affecting the childbear-
ing capacity of women but not men.3 3 Moreover, in cases alleging con-
stitutional violations, litigants rarely state their claims in these terms.
34
The treatment-impact dichotomy does not adequately capture the
variety of discrimination claims or facilitate the identification of appro-
priate uses of statistical evidence. The treatment-impact dichotomy is
merely a simple way to distinguish claims of intentional discrimination
from claims based solely on adverse effects. While our scheme encom-
passes this distinction, it goes further by distinguishing among inten-
tional discrimination claims. Our typology includes five categories of
discrimination: facial, pretext, disparate application, discretion, and
disparate impact. The next section of this Article discusses each cate-
gory; Table 1 presents an overview of this typology.
Categories of Discrimination
Facial Discrimination-Category I
Facial discrimination is a policy or action that on its face officially
disadvantages members of a minority, treats people differently simply
because of their minority status, or classifies on the basis of a character-
tral, both on its face and in its application, and the effect of the policy was to discharge more
blacks than whites, the court held that the case should be decided by disparate treatment
analysis. Under this analysis, the plaintiffs lost because the parties had stipulated that there
was no disparate treatment and that the policy was not racially motivated. See also Wil-
liams, supra note 24, at 670; cf. EEOC v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 26 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 198 (N.D. Ga. 1981), where the evidence of racially adverse effect of the
garnishment rule was not specifically tied to the employer's workforce. Because of the rela-
tive burdens of proof, litigants rarely argue that a disparate treatment allegation should be
analyzed under the disparate impact theory. See generally Furnish, A Path Through the
Maze- Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REv. 419 (1982).
33. For a court directly grappling with this issue, see Wright v. Olin Corp., 30 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 889, 898-901 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Williams, supra note 24, at
668-703.
34. The equal protection conception of discrimination has three components: (1) it
must involve governmental as opposed to private decisionmaking; (2) it must involve inten-
tional rather than inadvertent governmental policy; and (3) it must disadvantage an identifi-
able group in comparison with some other group. See generally Developments in the Law--
Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969). Proof of the racial impact of a challenged
action might be some evidence of illegal motive, but only in rare cases will proof of impact
alone be sufficient for a constitutional prima facie case. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
241, 242 (1977).
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istic that defines majority or minority group status. Unequal or inferior
treatment is implicit in facial discrimination. 35 For example, in
Strauder v. West Virginia,36 a black defendant successfully challenged
his murder conviction by a jury from which blacks were excluded by a
state law defining eligible jurors as white male citizens of the state. The
unlawfulness or unacceptability of such an overtly racial and obviously
stigmatizing classification is apparent, unless it is justified by "legiti-
mately defensible differences." 37 Discriminatory motivation is seldom
at issue in facial discrimination; the act of classifying implies the inten-
tion to discriminate. Justifying racial classifications is extremely diffi-
cult because constitutional cases require a compelling state interest and
certain statutory defenses are unavailable.38 Classifications on the ba-
sis of gender are less difficult to justify but still require proof of an
important governmental interest or meeting the bona fide occupational
qualification exception.39
35. Of course, not all facial classifications are unacceptable. In the dictionary sense,
"discriminate" is simply another word for "distinguish." One of the purposes of legislation
is to distinguish one situation from another (requiring an operator's license for a car but not
a bicycle) or this group from that (lawyers and barbers must pass a state licensing exam but
historians and piano teachers need not). Cf. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
225 (1962) discussing Railway Express Co. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949): "The legisla-
tive purpose, however, may have been, not merely to regulate traffic and protect the public,
but also to discriminate. Two policies may have been served in tandem. ... Ordinarily,
a legislature need only have a rational basis for the classification and rationality is usually
presumed to exist. In contrast, because racial and gender classifications often reflect stereo-
typed prejudices, they do not enjoy the presumption of rationality. Race and gender are-or
under constitutional theory and current social policy ought to be-irrelevant to most legiti-
mate governmental goals.
36. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
37. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1223-24 (1970). Ely uses, and we adopt, this term to include various levels of justifica-
tion under the Constitution or applicable statutes.
38. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (bona fide
occupational qualification does not apply to race).
39. During the 1980-81 term, the Supreme Court twice reiterated the different levels of
scrutiny and acceptable justification for gender cases. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981), the Court upheld California's statutory rape law under which males were
perpetrators and females were victims in the face of an equal protection challenge by a 17-
year-old boy charged under the statute. The Court said that gender-based classifications are
not inherently suspect and thus do not call for strict scrutiny; rather, such laws will be up-
held if they bear a substantial relationship to important governmental objectives. The Court
accepted that one purpose of the statute and a strong state interest is the prevention of teen-
age pregnancies, despite arguments that (1) pregnancy may not be a possible result of a
statutory rape, (2) the purpose of pregnancy prevention could be served by punishing both
males and females, and (3) a similar state interest in deterring teenage fatherhood exists.
In Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), the plaintiff argued that the male-only draft
registration statute should be tested by strict scrutiny, but the lower federal court applied the
so-called middle level scrutiny (substantial relationship to important governmental ebjec-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol, 34
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Whether to characterize certain race or gender specific laws or pol-
icies as facially discriminatory is sometimes disputed. For example,
one could argue, and until recently could do so successfully, that segre-
gation laws or laws that imposed criminal liability for interracial mar-
riage did not involve unequal treatment because they applied to blacks
and whites alike. The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education
4°
meant to avoid this argument by suggesting that educational segrega-
tion adversely affected blacks but not whites, because black students
were stigmatized by the separation.41 While.there are several justifica-
tions for the court's result,42 Professor Charles Black asserted most di-
rectly that
if a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which
is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an infer-
ior station, and if the question is then solemnly propounded whether
such a race is being treated "equally," I think we ought to exercise
one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter.43
tives) and found the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed. Although the
government argued for the traditional minimum scrutiny test, the Court refused to "refine"
the applicable tests and at least gave lip service to the test enunciated by the lower court and
in Michael M, decided three months earlier. Id at 69. The Court stated that the govern-
ment's interest in raising and supporting armies is an important governmental interest and
that Congress' decision not to include women in draft registration was entitled to great def-
erence, especially because Congress had considered the Act's constitutionality. Congress did
not, however, base its conclusion on the arguments that including women would inhibit the
smooth functioning of the military, or, given the combat restrictions, drafting women for
emergencies would be futile. See also Loewy, Returned to the Pedestal-The Supreme Court
and Gender Classpfcation Cases.- 1980 Term, 60 N.C.L. REv. 87 (1981).
Any suggestion that a majority of the Court was retreating from even the middle level
of scrutiny was temporarily allayed by last term's decision in Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982). Reiterating the applicability of the close and substantial
test, the Court in a 5-4 decision upheld a constitutional challenge by a male applicant to the
single-sex admissions policy of MUW's School of Nursing. The four dissenting Justices
argued for a less rigorous standard.
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41. There is considerable criticism of the Court's reliance on social science evidence to
support this conclusion. See, e.g., P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1972); The Courts, Social Science and School Desegregation, Part I, 39 LAW & CONTEMp.
PROBS. 217 (B. Levin and W. Hawley, eds. 1975); Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism
of the Social Scientst'r Role, 5 VILL. L. REv. 224 (1960); Gregor, The Law, Social Science,
and School Segregation: An Assessment, 14 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 621 (1963). The trend
probably started with Calm, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 150 (1955) and 31 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 182 (1956).
42. Compare 3. COLEMAN, et al, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966)
with U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLs (1967)
(whether blacks learn better when exposed to whites); Bell, School Litigation Strategies/or
the 1970s: New Phases in the Continuing Questfor Quality Schools, 1970 Wisc. L. REv. 257
(1970) ("separate" facilities are likely to be tangibly unequal).
43. Black, The Law/ulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960);
cf Ely, supra note 37, at 1230 (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which
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If the purpose of such laws is to create an inferior class of people, the
law is unacceptable; there is no need to prove unequal treatment or to
identify further the adverse effect. 44 Thus, because facial discrimina-
tion is relatively easy to observe and prove, statistical evidence is rarely
needed to establish a prima facie case.
determined the unconstitutionality of antimiscegenation laws and involved overt racial
classification).
44. In contrast to segregation laws, one can argue more plausibly that requiring women
to pay more during working years to get equal benefits upon retirement is not unlawful
unequal treatment but rather differential treatment that ensures equality because women on
the average substantially outlive men. Although the Supreme Court rejected this argument
in Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), discussion contin-
ues about whether Manhart's logic extends to more typical retirement programs that require
equal contributions but provide lower monthly benefits upon retirement for women. Com-
pare Freed & Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A Revisionirt
View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 585 (1981) (argu-
ing that Manhart was wrongly decided or at least should not be extended) with Brilmayer,
Hekeler, Laycock, & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans,- 4
Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505 (1980) (arguing that it should be
extended).
Similarly, the regulations under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1976), providing for reasonable accommodation of the known physical or mental
limitations of beneficiaries, 34 C.F.R. § 104.12 (1981) (Department of Education); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.12 (1981) (Department of Health and Human Services), and for auxiliary aids to ensure
accessibility to postsecondary education, 34 C.F.R. § 104.44 (1981), suggest that different
treatment is needed to assure nondiscrimination on the basis of handicap. The Supreme
Court's decision in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), holding
that the school's refusal to admit a student with a serious hearing impairment to its nursing
program did not violate § 504 because she was not "otherwise qualified," casts some doubt
on the validity of those regulations. The Court suggested that the statute requires only
"evenhanded" treatment of handicapped individuals and does not impose an affirmative
action obligation in terms of accommodating handicapped individuals. The Court went on
to say, however, "We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirma-
tive action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons always will be clear ...
[Situations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program might become unrea-
sonable and discriminatory." Id. at 412-13. This discussion is arguably unnecessary to the
resolution of the case and is thus dicta. In University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390
(1981), involving a graduate student's request that the university pay for his sign language
interpreter, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of the nature of the § 504 duty to
accommodate because of the procedural posture of the case. For a defense of the accommo-
dation duty in light of Southeastern see Note, Accommodating the Handicapped- Rehabiliat-
ing Section 504 after Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171 (1980); Note, Accommodating the
Handicapped- The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 oftthe Rehabilitation Act, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (1980).
Finally, whether to characterize race or gender distinctions that have no obviously stig-
matizing effect as facially discriminatory was raised but not addressed in Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The employer developed racially separate lists of
applicants and used different methods to determine which blacks and whites made the re-
spective lists. The racial composition of the employer's workforce, however, compared fa-
vorably with the relevant labor market.
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Intentional Covert Discrimination--Categories II, III, IV
Intentional covert discrimination occurs in at least three kinds of
situations, each involving a classification not explicitly based on race or
gender. In each situation establishing a claim of this type requires
proof of discriminatory motivation. These three situations may be dis-
tinguished by the manner in which the plaintiff is harmed, the conduct
of the defendant, and the nature of the inferences to be drawn. Inten-
tional covert discrimination is often termed "disparate treatment.1
45
This term is used primarily in statutory civil rights litigation; it is rarely
used to describe constitutional allegations or in constitutional litigation,
because in such cases racial- or gender-based motive is never irrele-
vant. At least in equal protection challenges, there is no need to distin-
guish cases requiring proof of motive from those that do not.
46
Pretext-Category II
Pretext cases arise when the defendant adopts a facially neutral
rule47 that is applied evenhandedly but which allegedly is intended to
disadvantage minorities. The pretext of a rule's superficial neutrality is
inferred from the rule's impact coupled with other extrinsic evidence.
48
The subterfuge of the stated purpose may be obvious, as in the first
group of cases discussed below, or ambiguous-even obscure, as in the
45. Obviously, facial discrimination (described in category I) also involves disparate
treatment, but because the act or policy is overt, disparity is not at issue.
46. Defining intention or motivation is, however, problematic. Intention is clearly
present when one possesses both actual knowledge that an action will cause a certain result
and a subjective desire for the discriminatory consequence. For example, in Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court held that intention would be
present if the legislature had enacted its veterans' preference because of, rather than in spite
of, its effect on women. For other purposes the law recognizes a vastly different concept-
that one intends the natural and probable consequences of one's action. If this concept had
been applied in Feeney, the Court would have found intent because of the preference's obvi-
ous adverse effect on women who first were barred and then underrepresented in the armed
forces. The difference between the first (subjective) and the second (objective) is not merely
a matter of logic nor a statement about assessing probabilities. The social choice is between
deference to public officials and acceptance of strong judicial authority. Baude & Lamber,
Civil Liberties: Desegregation, Prisoners' Rights and Employment Discrimination in the Sev-
enth Circuit, 55 CH.[-]KENT L. Rav. 31, 33 (1979).
47. We use the word "rule" to include laws, ordinances, policies, practices, or regula-
tions, whether written or unwritten. We intend no distinction regarding the form or source
of the rule. But cf. EEOC v. High Top Coal, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 310, 313 (E.D.
Tenn. 1980) (in which the court held that the device or practice that the plaintiff alleges is
facially neutral and has a disproportionate adverse effect must be objectively measurable,
such as an I.Q. test, grade point average, or the level of education).
48. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 18, at 37-44, label this category disparate treat-
ment-rulemaking, presumably because intent is at issue. However, no disparate treatment
actually takes place because the rule is applied evenhandedly.
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second group. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 49 the
burden shifts to the defendant to justify the rule or, more typically, to
negate the inference of pretext by establishing a legitimate purpose.
The ordinance involved in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,50 which required
that every male prisoner have his hair shaved or cut one inch from the
scalp, is a classic example of obvious pretext. A Chinese prisoner who
was shorn of his queue sued for damages, alleging that the deprivation
of the queue is regarded among the Chinese as a disgrace attended by
misfortune and suffering after death, and that the ordinance was passed
for the purpose of disgracing the Chinese. The plaintiff showed that
the ordinance had no other purpose, such as discipline or sanitation,
and even the state's proffered justification for the ordinance ("that only
the dread of the loss of his queue will induce a Chinaman to pay his
fine" 51) supported the finding of pretext. In Guinn v. United States
52
the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute requiring a liter-
acy test for all voters except those who were eligible on January 1,
1866, before the effective date of the fifteenth amendment, 53 and their
lineal descendants. The effect of the "neutral" law, excluding almost
all illiterate blacks and practically no illiterate whites, was sufficient to
establish an unconstitutional purpose. Finally, in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot 54 the Court held the Alabama legislature's boundary changes
for the city of Tuskegee unconstitutional. The 1957 law changed Tus-
kegee from a "sensible square" (with blacks constituting forty percent
of the registered voters) to an "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" that
excluded no whites and all but a few of the four hundred blacks.
55
In these three cases, the rule's operation reveals forbidden discrim-
inatory purpose; the cases focus attention on whether, and under what
49. We use the term prima facie case to describe the set of claims that if not rebutted by
the defendant would permit the plaintiff to win. We apply the term to describe the suffi-
ciency of the plaintiffs evidence to withstand a directed verdict at the end of the plaintiffs
case. Prima facie case can also mean the sufficiency to withstand a directed verdict at the
close of all the evidence and in that sense the defendant's evidence is properly taken into
account. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), states that the
presumptions established by the plaintiffs evidence are mandatory for the courts under title
VII. -d at 254 n.7.
50. 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546).
51. Id at 255.
52. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (effective 1870) provides: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." It is one of few constitutional
provisions whose language suggests an inquiry into motive.
54. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
55. Id at 340.
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circumstances, racially uneven effects sufficiently establish inferences of
racial discrimination. In Ho Ah Kow statistical evidence showing a ra-
cial disparity was unnecessary because intent and consequences were
obvious. In Guinn and Gomillion statistical evidence exposed the rule's
underlying discriminatory purpose. Although Guinn and Gomillion
arose under the fifteenth amendment, they illustrate proof of pretext
when the adverse impact of facially neutral laws is obvious and
extensive.
Washington v. Davis5 6 and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp. 57 are cases in which the alleged pretext is a "less
than obvious" subterfuge. In Washington v. Davis the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the District of Columbia police depart-
ment's recruitment procedures, particularly a verbal ability test, Test
21, that blacks failed four times more often than whites. The Supreme
Court did not infer impermissible motive based solely on proof of Test
21's impact. Moreover, the defendants' evidence of affirmative efforts
to recruit blacks and the changing racial composition of the police force
rebutted any possible inference of impermissible motive.
58
Motivation was more ambiguous in Arlington Heights. The
Supreme Court refused to infer impermissible motive from the local
government's refusal to rezone a tract of land to allow construction of
racially integrated low- and middle-income housing. The Court found
that the impact of the zoning decision fell more harshly on racial mi-
norities, but accepted the defendant's claim that its purpose was protec-
tion of property values and the integrity of the village's zoning plan.59
However, the reference to protection of property values could be a pre-
text, concealing a belief that racially integrated low- and middle-in-
come housing would prompt the predominantly white middle class to
leave their single-family residences. Because the plaintiffs in Washing-
ton v. Davis did not specifically charge discriminatory motive, but in-
stead relied on the test's disproportionate adverse effect, the case also
involves allegations discussed below under Disparate Impact--Cate-
gory V. Similarly, because the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights could not
prove discriminatory motive, their allegation might also be viewed as
an impact claim.
Although the statistical evidence of effect in Washington v. Davis
and Arlington Heights is similar to the evidence in the first group of
56. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
57. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
58. 426 U.S. at 246.
59. 429 U.S. at 269.
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cases, it was not sufficient to prove that the neutral rule was a pretext to
discriminate. The use of a verbal ability test or a zoning policy, in spite
of its racially uneven effects, is not readily perceived as discriminatory.
Additional evidence to establish impermissible motive is necessary. In
contrast, the purpose of removing a queue, of the literacy test exemp-
tion, or of the city boundary change, in light of their resulting effects, is
suspect. The less obvious the pretext, the more likely it is that the rule
will be justified.
Disparate Application--Category III
Disparate application arises when a facially neutral rule, adopted
for legitimate reasons, is applied unevenly on the basis of race or gen-
der. Like pretext cases, this category involves facially neutral rules and
focuses on the question of motive. It differs from pretext cases in that
these plaintiffs allege that racial- or gender-linked motives give rise to
unequal application of neutral rules, whereas pretext cases turn on the
permissibility of the motive underlying the rule's adoption. The de-
fendant must negate evidence of differential treatment or justify the
differences.
60
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,61 for example, involved the validity of a San
Francisco ordinance making it unlawful to establish or to maintain a
laundry in a wooden building without the Board of Supervisors' con-
sent. One purpose of the ordinance was to reduce the fire hazards
caused by the operation of laundries in wooden buildings. At the time
310 of the 320 laundries in the city were built of wood. The city denied
licenses to most but not all Chinese laundries and granted licenses to
all non-Chinese laundries except one. The Court had little trouble
finding impermissible motivation based on the evidence of the uneven
administration of the licensing procedure to the disadvantage of the
Chinese.6
2
Yick Wo illustrates an important 'feature of cases involving the op-
eration of facially neutral rules: purposeful discrimination often must
60. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 18, at 28-37, label these cases as disparate treat-
ment-rule-applying and treat class actions or pattern and practice suits separately from cases
brought by individuals. The problem with classifying such cases as International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and Hazelwood School Dist v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 75-79) under this rule-
applying theory is that it is difficult to specify the rule being unevenly applied.
61. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
62. Apparently the city was not entirely irrational or evil in its denial of licenses to
Chinese laundries. According to the city's counsel, the city withheld its licenses because the
Chinese persisted in disobeying or ignoring all of the city's laws. 30 L. Ed. 220, 224.
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be inferred from statistical data. Similarly, in cases involving the dis-
criminatory selection of juries, such as Castaneda v. Partida,63 courts
rely on evidence of racial patterns of administration to support the in-
ference of unconstitutional application. Some school desegregation
cases require similar statistical evidence to show uneven application.
This is true when a neighborhood school policy, facially neutral and
arguably legitimate in purpose, is allegedly administered, through
transfer policies or gerrymandered school districts, to achieve or per-
petuate segregation.64 In contrast, if the plaintiffs allege that the school
board adopted the neighborhood school policy in order to perpetuate
or create segregation, the case properly would be characterized as an
allegation of pretext rather than of application.
65
Discretion--Category IV
A third type of intentional covert discrimination occurs when the
plaintiff simply asserts that he or she became the focus of racial- or
gender-based animus that the defendant denies or seeks to disguise.
This claim differs from the previous ones in that either no rule governs
the defendant's behavior or the defendant has considerable discretion
in applying a certain rule. The defense to this type of charge may be a
simple denial of any differential treatment based on race or gender; in
other cases the defendant may articulate a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its action. 66 The defendant may also assert that its deci-
sion was discretionary and thus no reasons need be given. In each of
these situations the plaintiff in turn attempts to prove that the articu-
lated reason or assertion of discretion is not the real reason for the
63. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
64. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977). See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
65. Bickel, supra note 35, at 213-18, suggests that these cases, involving jury selection
and school desegregation, illustrate the possibility and permissibility of inquiring into mo-
tive where the decisionmaker is an administrator (subject to cross-examination) rather than
an entire legislature. For him, the act of administering a particular law is more likely to
involve an identifiable decision to scrutinize, and less deference is owed to administrators
than legislatures. Accord, D. Baldus & J. Cole, supra note 18, at 43-44. Ely, supra note 37,
at 1281-98, argues that the difference between administrators and legislatures is the wrong
distinction to make. In his view the question is whether the disadvantageous distinction
model applies. If it does, inquiries into motive are irrelevant. If this model does not apply,
motive may be relevant to show either the non-random pattern of a supposedly random
process or that illegitimate criteria tainted the exercise of discretion.
66. Under title VII the defendant has the burden of production, not the burden of
proof, in this situation. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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plaintiff's treatment.67 In this respect discretion cases resemble the pre-
text cases in category two. As in the pretext cases, statistical data show-
ing a pattern of differential treatment of minority and majority group
members support the inference that group membership, not the normal
exercise of discretion, is the basis of the defendant's decision.
This claim also differs from the others because discretion is not
necessarily discriminatory. However, the law's willingness to permit
subjective or discretionary decisions does not mean that exercising dis-
cretion on the basis of race or gender is permissible. An unwillingness
to require a decisionmaker to detail permissible differences or to choose
between specified goals does not imply the freedom to invoke imper-
missible differences and goals, although it does create an extraordina-
rily difficult burden of proof.68  While an extreme definition of
subjective judgment or discretion might mean that it is permissible to
consider race or gender, such a definition would mean that discrimina-
tion is permissible, and that is unacceptable.
69
Cases in this category often allege purposeful discrimination
67. The classification in D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 18, at 33-37, that most
closely approximates the one in the text is the "disparate treatment-rule-applying-indi-
vidual claimant model."
68. For example, in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259
(1981), the Court said, "ITIhe employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified
candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria."
69. Discretion differs from what we call overt discrimination primarily in its covert
nature (see cells c and d in Table 1). However, this difference has two important implica-
tions: "discretion" challenges require proof of discriminatory motive and allow the defend-
ant the possible responses of either asserting some nondiscriminatory reason or simply
claiming that the decisionmaking process is inherently and properly discretionary. In con-
trast, overt discrimination means the defendant openly uses race or gender as a criterion.
Thus, the defendant cannot assert that he had a nondiscriminatory basis for his decision or
that the nonexistence of a rule permits racial decisions. The only defense, like facial dis-
crimination in category I, is a legitimately defensible difference or justification.
For example, overt discrimination is raised by a restaurant owner's decision to operate
a "classy" restaurant requiring only men as food servers. Because the discretionary decision
of what kind of restaurant to operate involves gender considerations, the question is whether
the owner can establish a legitimately defensible difference or justification under title VII.
Arguably, such a decision is not permissible since women are able to perform the job and
the perception that male-only waiters present an image with more class rests on perceptions
of customer preferences. On the other hand, the decision may be justified given the legiti-
mate interests of the owner in what kind of business to operate. Customer preferences are
obviously real elements of the marketing of the owner's product. Thus, the existence of
discretion means that not only is the plaintifis prima facie case difficult to establish but also
that the defendant's justification is difficult to evaluate. See generally Sirota, Sex Discrimina-
tion: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualication, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1051
(1977); Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qual&fcation: Title VII's Evolving Enigma,
Related Litigation Problems, and the Judicial Vision of Womanhood After Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 5 WOMENs' Rrs. L. REP. 107 (1979).
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against a single individual.70 In McDonnell Douglas v. Green71 the
plaintiff alleged that his former employer refused to hire him because
of his civil rights activities, making his race a factor in the decision.
The defendant responded that its refusal was based on the plaintiff's
participation in an illegal protest against the employer. The Supreme
Court remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to show that the defend-
ant's stated reason was a pretext.72 In another case illustrating the diffi-
culty of proving discrimination where employer discretion is involved,
Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,73 the Court held that the defend-
ant's failure to take applications for employment and its policy of hir-
ing only people known to it were not sufficient to prove a violation of
title VII, although the plaintiffs alleged that the subjective hiring pro-
cess treated black and white applicants differently.74 The Court stated
that the employer was not obligated to use a hiring system that maxi-
mized the number of minority applicants, intimating that in this in-
stance employer discretion was appropriate.
When plaintiffs are unable to identify in what way defendants use
race or gender imperriissibly, they may rely on statistical evidence of
disproportionality to infer a causal relationship between race and the
discretionary decision. For example, in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States75 and Hazelwood School District v. United
States,76 the government7 7 alleged that racial considerations entered
into the defendants' hiring decisions but did not indicate how. To es-
tablish intentional discrimination in the defendants' hiring, the govern-
ment used statistical evidence showing that blacks were
70. As is true of other categories, they may be brought as class actions, subject to the
requirements of FED. R. Cry. P. 23.
71. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
72. On remand, the plaintiff failed to prove that McDonnell Douglas's stated reason for
not rehiring him was a pretext. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir.
1976).
73. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
74. See supra note 44. The plaintiffs also alleged that the employer's failure to take
applications at the gate had an adverse effect on blacks.
75. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
76. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
77. In these title VII actions the United States brought a pattern and practice suit under
the authority of § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The government
assumed, but has not challenged, that its authority is limited to bringing cases alleging inten-
tional discrimination. Since 1972 the EEOC has had authority to bring title VII suits in
addition to the Department of Justice's pattern and practice authority. The EEOC has not
conceived its authority as limited to allegations of intentional discrimination. For a general
discussion of government enforcement, see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-VOL. V (1974); THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EN-
FORCEMENT EFFORT-To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A SEQUEL (1977).
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underrepresented in the defendants' workforce in comparison to their
availability. Testimony from individuals about the defendants' racial
policies78 and historical evidence of past discriminatory practices 79 but-
tressed the statistical proof; all supported the inference of intentional
discrimination.
In other cases involving discretionary decisionmaking, courts have
not concluded that race or gender was the basis of the challenged deci-
sion, even with evidence similar to that in Teamsters and Hazelwood.
For example, in Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality Leagues°
the plaintiffs alleged that the mayor acted unconstitutionally in refus-
ing to consider qualified blacks for appointment to four thirteen-mem-
ber nominating commissions. Nine appointments for each commission
were to be made from designated organizations or institutions and four
were entirely discretionary. Only eight blacks were selected for these
four nominating commissions that nominated the school board, al-
though the city and school populations were thirty-four percent black
and sixty percent black, respectively. The Supreme Court refused to
infer that race was a factor in the mayor's appointments because of
(1) the inherent difficulty of rationalizing discretionary choices, (2) its
view that the statistical evidence was irrelevant, and (3) the inadmissi-
bility of other evidence of the officials' motivation.8
The law's willingness to accept discretionary decisionmaking
means that proving intentional race or gender discrimination in such
cases is difficult. While statistical evidence of differences in treatment
or adverse impact may suggest that race or gender was the basis of the
decision, the courts are reluctant to limit discretion by inferring dis-
crimination unless race or gender is the most plausible basis for the
defendant's decision.
Disparate Impact-Category V
Impact challenges involve the application of a policy the plaintiff
admits is gender or race neutral (in creation, design, administration,
and language), but falls more harshly on minority group members
without being justified. This theoretical category of discrimination is
based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of title VII in Griggs v.
78. 433 U.S. at 305-06; 431 U.S. at 338-39.
79. 433 U.S. at 309 n.15; 431 U.S. at 337-38.
80. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
81. Id at 616-21. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 18, at 302-03 calculated the
probability that this outcome could have occurred by chance to be .0023, indicating extreme
improbability. However, the appropriate population to be used in comparison as a nondis-
criminatory standard is controversial. Id See also infra text accompanying notes 128-36.
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Duke Power Co. 8 2 In deciding Griggs, the Court also created the de-
fenses of business necessity and job-relatedness.
Because the disparate impact claim is defined in terms of effect,
evidence of adverse impact, often statistical in form, is indispensable.
In Griggs, the Court found that the application of the employer's en-
trance and transfer policy, which required passing two standard intelli-
gence tests and possession of a high school diploma, disqualified
proportionally more blacks than whites.8 3 It held that the employer's
evidence of good faith and its desire to improve the overall quality of
the workforce were not sufficient to sustain the requirements in the face
of their adverse effect on blacks.
84
The unlawfulness or impropriety of facially neutral rules adversely
affecting minority group members is not as apparent as those motivated
by an intention to disadvantage minority group members. When the
rule in question is race or gender neutral, evenly applied, and not
prompted by race or gender considerations, the resulting impact may
not be perceived as discriminatory in the same manner as the acts or
policies in categories I through IV. Charges of discrimination based on
adverse impact reflect a broadened conception of discrimination, one
focusing only on consequences rather than on motive or treatment.
This expanded definition, also held by social scientists,8 5 stems from a
growing recognition of pervasive racial discrimination in the labor
force, educational institutions, and housing.8 6 The conclusion that ra-
82. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Because until 1982 the Supreme Court had decided only two
other disparate impact cases in favor of the plaintiff, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), there is some question
about the Court's commitment to this theory. Lerner, supra note 19, at 37. Also, some lower
courts and scholars may have misunderstood the premise of the Griggs decision. Williams,
supra note 24, at 671-72. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 n.7
(1978), Justice Rehnquist stated that the impact theory was not applicable to the case be-
cause neither an objective rule nor a test was at issue, casting some doubt on the general
applicability of the theory. See also EEOC v. High Top Coal, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases
(BNA) 310 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
In a third disparate impact case, Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982) (discussed
infra note 134) a divided Court disallowed an asserted defense that would have severely
limited the utility of the disparate impact theory. While the Court upheld the plaintiffs'
challenge, the alleged disparate impact arose from the application of a written test and thus
involved the theory in its original context.
83. 401 U.S. at 426.
84. Id at 432.
85. See, e.g., WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE
(D. Treiman & H. Hartman eds. 1981); Duncan, Discrimination Against Negroes, 371 AN-
NALS 85 (1967); Sigal, Judicial Use, fimvse, andAbuse of Statistical Evidence, 47 J. URB. L.
165 (1969).
86. Blumrosen, supra note 8, is credited with much of the theoretical justification. In
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cial discrimination is institutionalized in American society 87 implies
that the consequences of even nondiscriminatory acts can perpetuate
the social and economic subordination of blacks that originated in
overt discrimination. Thus, contemporary differences between minor-
ity and majority group members in their access to social goods or bur-
dens are seen by many as stemming from previous discriminatory
treatment and, hence, as indicators of discrimination.88
This expanded definition is not, however, accepted in equal pro-
tection litigation without proof of the underlying discriminatory treat-
ment and its nexus to the present disproportionate outcome. The
Supreme Court confirmed this difference between statutory and consti-
tutional conceptions in Washington v. Davis,89 holding that the plain-
tiffs' evidence of the disproportionate failure rates alone did not
establish a prima facie case under the fifth amendment.90 In school
Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Modelfor Defming "Discrimination, "
70 GEo. L.J. 1, 45-46 (1981), Professor Abernathy attributes the "popularization" of this
concept to Professor Brest. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Un-
constitutional Legislative Motive, Sup. CT. REv. 95, 110 (1971). Much of the literature about
constitutionally proscribed discrimination has focused on if and when courts should prop-
erly inquire into legislative motivation. Compare id with D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note
18, at 37-44; compare A. BICKEL, supra note 35, at 208-21 (1962) with Ely, supra note 37, at
1205 (1970).
87. See generally DISCRIMINATION IN ORGANIZATIONS (R. Alvarez & K. Lutterman
eds. 1979).
88. Id; Blumrosen, supra note 8, at 62; Fiss, supra note 8, at 238-39.
89. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
90. The fifth amendment's due process clause is considered to have an equal protection
component. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); see Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S.
636, 638 n.2 (1975).
Of course, Washington v. Davis could be wrong on at least three levels. First, as a
matter of precedent, Justice White for the majority states "our cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact." 426 U.S. at 239. And "[s]tanding alone [disproportionate impact] does not trigger
the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny .. " Id at
242 (citation omitted). Although Justice White distinguished Wright v. Council of the City
of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), and several jury
exclusion cases (discussed above in category III), the distinction is obviously strained. Sec-
ond, as a matter of equal protection theory, one can argue that "protection" means the
government has a responsibility to eliminate racially disproportionate outcomes that occur
even at the hands of equal treatment. Third, the Court may be mistaken as a matter of
statutory interpretation of the District of Columbia Municipal Code and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Assuming that disparate impact is sufficient to shift the burden to the city, but see infra note
92, the Court accepts the government's argument that the verbal ability test is job-related
because success on the test correlates with success in the police training program. While the
record showed that everyone who passes the test "passes" the training program, there was no
evidence that the training program (or the test) was related to successful performance on the
jobs for which the test was used. For detailed discussion and criticism of Washington v.
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desegregation cases where the issue is the school board's affirmative
duty under the Constitution to dismantle a dual system, evidence of
effect is the sole test.91 But school cases are not inconsistent with Wash-
ington v. Davis because this affirmative duty only arises after a finding
that a school board intentionally created or maintained a dual
system.92
While extending the definition of discrimination to neutral policies
not intended or consciously used to discriminate, the Griggs Court also
changed the nature of the available justification. This justification, dif-
ferent from those allowed in categories I through IV, recognizes the
defendant's right to promulgate policies without regard to their inci-
dental racial or gender effects, provided that the policies are truly di-
rected to central business or government concerns.
93
Davis see Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Tern-Foreword In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1976); Perry, supra note 8; Note, Discriminatory
Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REy. 1376
(1979).
91. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
92. E.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974). However, the threshold for implying motive may be lower in school
cases than in other situations.
In the 1980-81 term the Supreme Court granted review in City of Memphis v. Greene,
451 U.S. 100 (1981), to decide whether a showing of discriminatory intent is necessary for
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 or the thirteenth amendment (abolishing slavery and involun-
tary servitude) as it is for actions under § 1983 or the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of closing a street in a white
neighborhood that abutted a black neighborhood. The majority concluded, however, that
the record failed to support a finding that property rights of black citizens were adversely
affected by the street closing and did not reach the motive-impact question. The dissent
found an impermissible racial motive and avoided the motive-impact question. Only Justice
White, concurring in the majority opinion, reached the issue and concluded that proof of
motive was necessary for a § 1982 violation. The motive-impact question is also raised by
§ 1981, protecting contractual rights, argued by the plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis. Al-
though commentators generally have urged an impact definition, e.g., Note, Section 1981:
Discriminatory Purpose or Disproportionate Impact?, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 137 (1980); Note,
Racially Disproportionate Impact of Facially Neutral Practices-W "at Approach Under 42
U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1982?, 1977 DuKE L.f. 1267 (1977), last term the Court held that
§ 1981 requires proof of purposeful discrimination. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 102 S. Ct. 3141 (1982).
93. Whether the defense is broader or narrower than those in categories I through IV
depends on how the Griggs defense is interpreted. The defense step of the Griggs analysis,
however, is not yet entirely developed. For a discussion of the various interpretations, see
Williams, supra note 24, at 671-73; Comment, Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact
Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 911 (1979); Note, Rebutting the Griggs Prima
Facie Case Under Title VII Limiting Judicial Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives, 1981 U.
ILL. L.F. 181 (1981).
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Use of Statistics
This theoretical scheme suggests differences across categories in
the kind, role, and effect of statistics in discrimination cases. Statistics
may be direct or indirect evidence of the alleged discrimination. They
may be used to support an inference of impermissible purpose or to
rule out a causal relationship between the outcome and a permissible
purpose. Statistics may be indispensable, useful, or irrelevant. In some
situations, moreover, proof of discrimination is inherently statistical be-
cause the behavior in question can be profitably observed only in the
aggregate; in other situations proof is inherently statistical because of
the nature of the legal question raised by the plaintiff.94 These differ-
ences, summarized in Table 2, are the focus of the next section.
Facial Discrimination--Category I
In cases of facial discrimination, statistics are irrelevant in proving
that racial or gender classifications exist. The defendant may introduce
statistics to justify a classification based on race or gender or the plain-
tiff may do so to rebut the defendant's asserted justification. For exam-
ple, Craig v. Boren95 involved the constitutionality of an Oklahoma
statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under twenty-one and
females under eighteen. The state introduced statistical data to demon-
strate a strong correlation between gender and alcohol-related traffic
accidents. However, the Supreme Court rejected the quantitative evi-
dence as methodologically flawed and the proffered relationship be-
tween the evidence and the state's conduct as too tentative.96  In
Fronfiero v. Richardson ,97 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality
of a statutory scheme providing dependency benefits for wives of mili-
tary servicemen without regard to their actual dependency, but provid-
ing dependency benefits for husbands only upon proof that they
depended on their wives for at least half of their support. The govern-
ment argued that, because wives frequently depend on husbands while
husbands are rarely dependent on their wives, presuming wives' depen-
dency while requiring husbands to establish dependency was cheaper
94. Cf. cases discussed under Pretext-Category II, see infra notes 99-107 & accompa-
nying text, and Disparate Impact-Category V, see infra notes 124-44 and accompanying
text. See also Michelson, Statistical Determination in Employment Discrimination Issues, in
THE USE/NoNusE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS 111-13 (M. Saks
& C. Baron eds. 1980).
95. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
96. Id at 202-04.
97. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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and easier. Although the Court recognized that husbands are less
likely to be dependent, it accepted the plaintiffs statistical evidence
that, under the same test, many servicemen's wives would fail to qual-
ify for benefits as a rebuttal of the government's justification. 9
Pretext-Category II
In pretext cases, statistical data are useful but not necessary or by
themselves sufficient to prove discrimination. As the cases Ho Ah Koh,
Guinn, and Gomillion discussed above suggest, 99 statistical evidence of
the racially uneven consequences of a particular law or policy is ex-
tremely useful in establishing the requisite inference of racial or gender
motivation. Statistics are not indispensable, however, because some
cases may contain direct evidence of impermissible motive or historical
data from which to infer motive. For example, in Palmer v. Thomp-
son,l°° a 1971 Supreme Court case challenging the constitutionality of
closing the Jackson, Mississippi public swimming pools, the plaintiff
sought to prove the closings were racially motivated by introducing di-
rect evidence of the mayor's motive (to avoid integrating the pools) and
historical data (the closings followed a court order to integrate). Al-
though the Court chose to ignore this evidence and accepted without
serious question the validity of the state's argument that integration
would be too costly,101 the Court's holding in Palmer v. Thompson has
been frequently criticized, 10 2 distinguished, 0 3 and ultimately buried.104
Thus, the feasibility and utility of direct evidence or historical data is
unimpaired. 105
98. Although the plurality's holding in Frontiero that sex is a suspect classification sub-
ject to strict scrutiny on review has never gained a majority, the Court has consistently and
unanimously struck down similar dependency or wage earner statutes. See, e.g., Califano v.
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
100. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
101. The state argued that whites would not pay to swim with blacks. Id at 225.
102. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1027-28 (1978); Brest, supra note 86,
at 95-102.
103. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1976).
104. L. TRIBE, supra note 102, at 1031 n.28.
105. For example, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), Justice Powell stated that "[d]etermining whether invidious discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available." Id at 266. Included in his list of evidentiary
sources are the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision, and the legislative and administrative history of contemporary
statements by members of the decisionmaking body. 1d at 267-68.
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In still other pretext cases, the Court may engage in a traditional
balancing test, rather than relying on statistical evidence, to judge
whether the means chosen fit the desired goal or are a subterfuge for
gender or race distinctions. The Supreme Court stated that the balanc-
ing test would be appropriate in GeneralElectric v. Gilbert,0 6 where the
female plaintiffs challenged the exclusion of pregnancy from the em-
ployer's disability plan. In Gilbert, however, the defendant used statis-
tics to show greater per capita expenditures for female employees, thus
suggesting that the disability plan favored rather than discriminated
against female employees.
0 7
In pretext cases where it is not obvious that the classification is a
subterfuge, such as Washington v. Davis andArlington Heights, statisti-
cal comparisons are unlikely to suffice in establishing racial motive.
These cases involve the application of a neutral governmental policy
that disproportionately adversely affects minority group members. Al-
though the evidence of adverse effect was clear, these cases included
little additional evidence to support an inference that the policy was
adopted as a subterfuge or that the true motive was to affect minorities
adversely. In order to prevail, the plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis, for
example, would have needed evidence to show that Test 21, rather than
some other verbal ability test, was adopted because of its racial impact.
Disparate Application--Category III
In cases alleging disparate application of a neutral rule, statistical
evidence is indispensable and often beyond rebuttal. Such evidence
usually involves data gleaned from the results of repeated applications
of the rule. A statistical pattern of racial or gender-based differences in
these data supports the claim of disparate application.
Situations requiring a random selection or decisionmaking pro-
cess, for example, jury selection, are straightforward. Using elementary
rules of probability, litigants can show the probability of some particu-
106. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
107. In cases involving other allegations of discrimination in our typology, the defend-
ant may also respond by introducing statistics suggesting that members of minority groups
fare better than majority group individuals. In response to black bricklayers' challenge of its
hiring procedure, Furnco Construction Company showed that blacks were overrepresented
in "man-days" relative to their proportion in the union. Although the plaintiff disputed this
proportion, which varied between the time the hiring practice was challenged and the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, the court of appeals noted that the plaintiffs' study
would not have shown discrimination since the proportion of blacks in the union and of
black "man-days" were almost identical. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 571-
72 n.2 (1978).
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lar set of observed outcomes, assuming the process by which they were
generated is random. If the statistics indicate that the observed out-
come would rarely occur given a random process, the plaintiff can ar-
gue for rejecting the claim that the process was truly random. 08 If the
process was not random, then it cannot be justified by the defendant. 109
Many administrative processes are not expected to be random, but,
over the long run, evenhanded application should generate random re-
sults with respect to irrelevant characteristics such as race or gender.
Examples include choosing between equally qualified job applicants or
the placement of school boundaries under a neighborhood school pol-
icy. Statistical data supporting challenges to these practices would
compare the actual proportion or number of decisions disfavoring the
minority with the proportion or number expected on the basis of some
nondiscriminatory standard.110
When plaintiffs allege that a rule is applied unfairly, the strongest
108. Under statistical decision theory, a hypothesis can never be rejected with certainty.
Statistical theory permits rejecting very unlikely results with some very low but specified
probability of doing so erroneously. See infra notes 139-40, 142.
109. Of course, theprocess used must be examined. One cannot prove discrimination
because no minority individuals were on a particular jury or because a particular panel had
no minority members. No particular draw is suspect, but a pattern of venires, among which
minorities are routinely underrepresented, raises doubts about the randomness of the selec-
tion process. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625 (1972).
A similar question is raised by the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate blacks
from juries. Under the traditional view, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), courts have held that the use of peremptory challenges to
exclude blacks from a jury in a particular case is not constitutionally impermissible absent a
showing (by the defendant) that such use is systematic in every case. E.g., United States v.
Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 438 A.2d 951 (Pa.
1981). Recently, several state courts have restricted this use of the peremptory challenge.
These cases usually rely on interpretations of state constitutions and rest on the theory that
such misuse frustrates the defendant's right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community. E.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (1978); People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982); Common-
wealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979). For a discussion of the underlying
theory to justify regulation of peremptory challenges, see Note, Prosecutorial Misuse of the
Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Discrete Groups From the Petit Jury. Commonwealth .
Soares, 21 B.C.L. REV. 1197 (1980); Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial
Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770 (1979); Note, Limiting the Per-
emptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977).
110. For example, if a department hires assistant professors of English and women com-
prise 40% of the qualified applicants, over the long run one would expect the composition of
this particular group of assistant professors of English to be 60% male and 40% female. Of
course, this does not mean that the department must hire a man one time and a woman the
next or every third time. If the department hires 20 assistant professors, however, and none
of them is a woman, this evidence would be relevant to whether the professors are chosen
according to qualifications or by gender.
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statistical evidence would show that the results of applying the rule dif-
fer for minority and majority groups. For example, an employer may
state that wages are determined by seniority, and the plaintiff alleges
that the effect of seniority on wages differs for the two groups. Statisti-
cal evidence showing that the effect of seniority on wages is equivalent
for minority and majority group members is consistent with equal
treatment. A stronger effect for majority than minority group mem-
bers, however, indicates a greater payoff from seniority for the majority
and thus implies disparate application. Unfortunately, the data for the
necessary statistical analyses"' are seldom available because they re-
quire information for all minority and majority group members on the
characteristics upon which the challenged outcome is supposed to de-
pend, here, on wages and seniority. Instead, litigants typically rely on
statistics comparing the proportion of minority group members who
experience the outcome with either the proportion of majority individ-
uals who do so or the proportion of minority persons at risk of exper-
iencing the outcome.' 1 2 For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins"13 the
statistics showed that Chinese who operated laundries in wooden
buildings were almost never granted a license while Caucasions almost
always were. Similarly, evidence in Furman v. Georgia114 indicated
that blacks were disproportionately executed relative to their propor-
tion among those on whom the death penalty was imposed.'
15
Once established, a prima facie case in an application case, as well
as in pretext cases, has an additional consequence. If discriminatory
motivation is implied, the relevant legal question in these cases is the
same as in cases of facial discrimination: is the policy justified? In fact,
once a prima facie case of pretext or application is established, the
plaintiff's case is often stronger than in cases of facial discrimination
because the defendant's original justification has already been rejected,
111. Ideally, the plaintiff would show this effect by comparing partial regression coeffi-
dents for the two groups that control for other factors that could account for the outcome.
See Reskin & Hargens, Scientic Advancement of Male and Female Chemists, in DISCRIMI-
NATION IN ORGANIZATIONS (R. Alverez and K. Lutterman eds. 1979); Finkelstein, supra
note 19.
112. See infra notes 145-62 & accompanying text for discussion of expressions of
disproportionality.
113. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
114. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
115. In any challenge in which the plaintiff infers differential treatment from data show-
ing differences in outcome, the defendant may respond by contending that pre-existing
group differences, rather than disparate application, explain the differential outcomes. See
Lerner, supra note 19, at 25 n.23. However, the defendant's claim would be strengthened by
data showing differences on some characteristic that is appropriately taken into account in
the decisionmaking process.
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and any subsequent justification is suspect. For example, once the
plaintiffs such as those in Castaneda v. Partida show that jury selection
is not random, there is little the defendant can say to justify the racial
composition of the jury.
Characterizing a case as facial discrimination or as discrimination
by pretext or application also has implications in terms of the burden of
proof: the same evidence relevant to the defendant's justification in
facial discrimination is part of the plaintiff's case in pretext or applica-
tion cases, because a showing of pretext or unequal application in-
volves refuting possible justifications. For example, in cases involving
the exclusion of pregnant or fertile women from certain jobs to protect
the fetus from in utero exposure to workplace hazards, a key issue is
whether scientific evidence suggests a relationship between the occupa-
tional hazard and male reproductive capacity. If women are explicitly
excluded, the burden of justification falls on the employer (or the state
if the exclusion is by legislation) who no doubt will attempt to address
the scientific evidence issue. If the exclusion is phrased neutrally,116 the
burden of showing pretext or uneven application falls on the female
plaintiff. Evidence of pretext might include scientific evidence regard-
ing the effect on male workers' offspring or might show that women are
not excluded from all jobs that are hazardous to fetuses. Who bears the
burden of proof concerning scientific evidence is often crucial to the
outcome of a particular case.
Discretion-Category IV
Statistical evidence, however compelling, is rarely sufficient to
prove that discrimination took place through the exercise of the deci-
sionmaker's discretion. Statistical comparisons based on the experi-
ence of several minority and majority group members may not be
possible, because many cases of this type involve nonroutine decisions,
such as the appointment of a university president. Alternatively, the
decisionmaking process in question may be incompatible with rules
that can be justified by some legitimately defensible differences." 7 For
example, the decisionmaking process used in drawing city or voting
district boundaries seldom can be justified in terms of differences be-
tween the persons or property on either side of the line. Indeed, no
legitimately defensible criterion for selection may exist. A prosecutor
may decide to prosecute one case, plea bargain in another, and drop
116. A neutral rule might exclude all people particularly susceptible to harm from an
occupational substance.
117. Ely, supra note 37, at 1230-49.
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charges in a third. In accepting these acts of discretion, the law reflects
an unwillingness to restrict the prosecutor's ability to choose among
acceptable goals." l8 Similarly, in recent capital punishment cases the
distinctions made by juries in imposing capital punishment on some
but not other defendants cannot be limited by a closed list of relevant
mitigating factors.'19
When discretionary decisions are made with sufficient frequency,
statistical data may show patterns bearing on whether race or gender
were actual considerations. The most useful statistical evidence in dis-
cretion or subjective judgment cases addresses three questions: is race
or gender related to the outcome, how strong is the relationship, and is
the race or gender relationship spurious, that is, can it be explained by
some other factor.1 20 In addressing the third question, the plaintiff
would attempt to rule out plausible alternative explanations for the re-
lationship, leaving race or gender as the most probable cause of the
outcome. If subjective judgment or discretion by the decisionmaker is
permissible, in the sense that the defendant need not explain its deci-
sion or be able to articulate its basis, the plaintiff has an extremely diffi-
cult burden of identifying and ruling out legitimate alternative reasons
for the decision.
121
In contrast, if the defendant has the burden of articulating a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, the plaintiff's task in
addressing the third question will be less onerous. The plaintiff wil not
have to rule out all plausible legitimate reasons because the defendant
suggests the reason. Thus, as the Court stated in Texas Department of
118. See generally K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969).
119. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). But see Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle,
Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN.
L: REv. 1 (1980).
120. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), illustrates these
questions. Statistics showing the underrepresentation of black teachers employed by the
school district relative to the proportion of black teachers in the immediate vicinity sup-
ported the plaintis claim that school district officials illegitimately considered race in hir-
ing decisions. In response to the school district's challenge regarding the size of the pool, the
Court remanded the case to allow the district court to resolve this dispute and to assess the
degree of disparity. The Court also suggested that the district court consider the third issue
(whether the relationship is spurious) raised by the defendant's argument that the racially
disparate outcome reflected pre-Act hiring, not discrimination in post-Act decisions. Id at
310, 313. In many cases this third issue is raised in arguments to the court, not by quantita-
tive evidence.
121. For example, differences in candidates' experience may be a legitimate reason.
Thus, categories III (application) and IV (discretion) differ in that in the former the plaintiff
knows the hypothesis being tested while in the latter statistical data are useful only after the
plaintiff had specified all the possible alternative hypotheses to assess.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Community Affairs v. Burdine,122 in delineating the nature of eviden-
tiary burdens in title VII cases: "The ultimate burden of persuading
the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination
[may be accomplished] directly by persuading the court that a discrimi-
natory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." 123 The defendant's burden, however, is not a heavy one,
because the ultimate burden of persuading the courts that race or gen-
der was a factor remains with the plaintiff. The locus of the burden of
proof is important, indeed, often determinative, because disproving
causation is statistically straightforward, given the necessary data,
while proving it is almost impossible.
Disparate Impact-Category V
In disparate impact cases as in disparate application cases, statisti-
cal evidence is indispensable; but here it is not beyond rebuttal. 124 The
plaintiff must show statistically that a rule neutral in design and appli-
cation adversely affects minority group members compared to the ma-
jority. Thus, the statistical evidence is direct evidence, not
circumstantial as it is in categories I-IV. Under the impact theory, a
showing of adverse effects shifts to the defendant the burden to prove
the legitimacy of the rule. 125 If the rule is an employment criterion
purportedly related to job performance, the defendant may use statisti-
cal evidence showing an association between the criterion and job per-
formance to justify the rule. Under the federal Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 126 job requirements that have an ad-
verse effect should be formally validated, so statistical measures of as-
sociation are common.
The indispensable nature of statistics in disparate impact cases
raises two related questions about statistical methods of proof that
neither the courts nor the statutes have adequately addressed. First,
should the statistics showing that a neutral rule adversely affects minor-
122. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
123. Id at 256.
124. Much of the literature regarding the use of quantitative methods to prove discrimi-
nation concerns impact cases. See supra notes 17-22 & accompanying text.
125. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court rejected the plaintiffs' at-
tempt to apply this theory to constitutional concepts of discrimination. Because the plaintiffs
did not allege impermissible motive on the defendants' part, it remains unclear under what
circumstances evidence of impact without justification is sufficient to infer motive. Cf Per-
sonnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
126. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295 (1978).
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ity group members be based on population data or on data for actual
applicants? Second, given that statistics showing adverse effect are the
prima facie case, how can one judge the probative value of the evidence
if the defendant asserts that the results are due to chance? We turn,
then, to a consideration of these two questions.
Statistical Questions In Disparate Impact Cases
Although similar questions may be raised regarding the use of sta-
tistics in the other categories, we limit this discussion to disparate im-
pact cases because of the direct nature of the statistical evidence used.
In the other categories, the evidence of effect is circumstantial and thus
serves a different purpose. Circumstantial evidence requires the
factfinder to infer a necessary fact from the evidence; thus, no matter
what the statistics show, the question remains whether to draw the nec-
essary inference. 27 Because impact cases are defined in terms of statis-
tics, statistical rules must be carefully observed.
Population or Actual Applicant Statistics
Whether the discriminatory effect must be shown on actual appli-
cants or on the population of potential applicants depends on the rea-
sons that the rule or requirement has an adverse impact. The most
straightforward cases would involve using traits biologically linked to
gender or race as criteria for employment. An example would be the
ability to bear children as the rationale for excluding women from jobs
in certain hazardous environments. In such a case, the biological link
between the selection criterion and the protected classification makes
empirical data on the actual consequences of the rule unnecessary.
If the selection criterion is biologically related to but not deter-
mined by gender, evidence showing the actual impact of the criterion is
more useful. For example, average heights and weights of men and
women are related to gender, but a woman is not biologically pre-
cluded from being tall or a man from being short. Thus, height and
weight restrictions fall, on the average, more heavily on one gender
than the other. Because this relationship is not perfect, however, em-
pirical data showing the actual effect of a height and weight rule on
actual or potential applicants have some value, especially if the defend-
ant challenges the relevance of overall population data to the local
situation.
Other selection criteria are linked to sex or race for social or his-
127. The inference in categories I-IV involves intention or impermissible motivation.
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torical rather than biological reasons. The high school diploma re-
quirement challenged in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 128 illustrates an
historically race-related criterion caused by the inferior education
blacks received in segregated schools. 129 The degree to which such cri-
teria fall more harshly on minority groups depends on whether the cri-
teria are strongly related to race or gender. In PersonnelAdministration
of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 30 for example, the plaintiff showed that
limits on the number of enlisted women' 3' strongly linked veteran sta-
tus to gender and thus the preference for veterans strongly favored men
over women. 1
32
The plaintiff uses population data to prove disparate impact by
establishing the relationship between the criterion and gender or
race 33 and then comparing how the two groups fare with respect to the
outcome at issue. The strength of this relationship depends on whether
the criteria are biologically or socially linked to race or gender. How-
ever, the stronger the relationship, the more likely the criterion will fall
more harshly on minority group members, thus supporting the plain-
tiff's use of population rather than actual applicant data. In Griggs and
Feeney, population data were sufficient evidence of effect. Impact data
on applicants are secondary: they may demonstrate short-run impact
on the plaintiffs, but are unnecessary to show the long-run adverse ef-
fect of a criterion on minority group members.
34
128. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
129. Id at 430.
130. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
131. The Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat.
356, 356-75 (1948), limited the number of women who could enlist to no more than two
percent of the total enlisted strength. This limitation was lifted in 1967. Pub. L. No. 90-130,
81 Stat. 374 (1967).
132. 442 U.S. at 269-70.
133. The plaintiff establishes this relationship using a statistical measure of association
or correlation between some outcome and gender or race. For example, in New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), a case challenging the agency's rule against
hiring people in methadone maintenance programs, the plaintiffs' data showed directly that
participation in such programs was associated with race but only implied that blacks and
Hispanics were more likely than whites to be disqualified from employment by the rule.
To demonstrate the strength of a relationship for nominal rather than quantitative vari-
ables (such as race or hired-not hired), percentage comparisons are most frequently used,
although Q and phi are appropriate summary measures. For assessing relationships be-
tween variables measured at the interval level (years of seniority or wages, for example),
associations may be demonstrated by showing a difference in means or proportions for the
two groups or with Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient. See H. BLALOCK, SO-
CIAL STATISTICS 223-43, 303-07, 396-410 (rev. 2d ed. 1979).
134. In addition to showing adverse effect of a particular rule, population data, rather
than applicant data, are used in disparate impact cases to establish minority group under-
representation in positions they seek. Demonstrating underrepresentation may be especially
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In contrast to the above examples, actual applicant data are neces-
sary to show disparate impact when the criterion involvesperformance.
For example, racial differences in standardized intelligence test per-
formances135 suggest that blacks might do more poorly on specific in-
telligence tests, but whether differences in performance actually occur
will depend both on the test used and on the specific test takers. To
prove the disproportionate impact of the intelligence tests in Griggs
would require actual test results of the employees at the Duke Power
Company, while state population data were sufficient to show the dis-
parate impact of the high school diploma requirement.1 36 In short, one
cannot infer from population data that a test or another measure of
performance will necessarily adversely affect one group. A plaintiff
must show actual differences in effect to support a claim of disparate
impact.
Are The Statistical Relationships Due to Chance?
Depending upon the population used to show disparate impact,
the question may arise whether an observed difference in outcome
merely reflects the operation of chance. According to the Griggs Court,
title VII concerns the effects of a neutral rule on groups defined by race
or gender and thus focuses on the rule's long-run effect on individuals
with characteristics similar to the plaintiffs'. 137 If the rule necessarily
affects one group for race- or gender-related reasons discussed above,
or if the impact data for the relevant population show an adverse effect,
then a long-run effect is at least highly probable. Whenever the selec-
important if the challenged criterion is but one of several criteria used for selection. See
infra text accompanying notes 163-66. However, it is not always necessary to show this
overall underrepresentation. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,
43 Fed. Reg. 38,295 (1978), adopt the so-called "bottom line" approach providing that if
information shows the total selection process does not have an adverse impact, the federal
government enforcement agencies, in the exercise of their discretion, will not require the
employer to evaluate individual components for adverse impact. Id at 38,297. Some courts
adopted the guidelines' enforcement approach as a rule of law, establishing a defense to
charges of discrimination. E.g., Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D.
Conn. 1979); cf Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975) (pre-Uniform Guidelines
decision), cert denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976). In a 5-4 decision last term, Connecticut v. Teal,
102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the "bottom line"
theory precludes establishing a prima facie case or provides a defense to such a cases.
135. See Lian, Abiliy Testing: Individual Diferences, Prediction and Djerential Predic-
tion, in 2 ABILITY TEsTnNG: USES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROVERSY (A. Widgor & W.
Garner eds. 1982).
136. However, the Court did not examine or require the actual test results in Griggs.
Instead, the Court relied on test performance results at a different company that used the
same standardized tests. 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
137. Id at 429-30.
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tion criterion, however, involves performance rather than some race- or
gender-linked attribute and the statistical evidence is based only on a
sample of the potentially affected population, demonstrating a long-run
effect is necessary but difficult.
Impact data on only those actually exposed to the rule, for exam-
ple, on actual job applicants, are subject to multiple interpretations and
so may be contested as due to chance. To show a long-run effect, plain-
tiffs may contend that the test or performance measure is sensitive to
minority group status or some characteristic linked with minority group
status in the larger population so that repeated administrations of the
test will continue to show an adverse impact on minority individuals.
In response, defendants may argue that "chance" rather than some bi-
ased feature of the test accounts for the difference in performance
scores of majority and minority individuals. First, the test itself may
not be sufficiently reliable that two administrations of the test to the
same set of persons would yield the same pattern of group differences.
Second, the test may be sensitive to some other characteristic, for exam-
ple, experience in taking similar tests, that is by chance related to mi-
nority group status among the test takers, but is not related to minority
group status in the population of all potential applicants. For example,
the particular group of individuals who took the test may have been
composed of high-scoring majority group persons and low-scoring mi-
norities, whereas subsequent administrations might show no difference
or the opposite pattern. Either alternative could mean that the differ-
ence between two groups of test takers does not reflect a real difference
in the populations of potential test takers and, therefore, implies no
long-run adverse effect.
In rebuttal to these arguments, plaintiffs can use statistical tests to
combat the charge that some random process-that is, chance-pro-
duced the results. If the test takers constitute a random sample 38 of all
potential test takers, this possibility could be resolved by using tests of
statistical significance. 139 Here, the test would assess whether the dif-
138. A random sample is a sample from a population in which all elements of the popu-
lation have a known and independent probability of being selected. H. BLALOCK, supra
note 133, at 139-43, 553-54.
139. In brief, a statistical significance test assesses the likelihood of a particular result for
a sample given assumptions about the population from which the sample is drawn. For a
discussion and application of such tests see Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing
and its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1980); Shoben, Differential Pass-
Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Tile VI11, 91 HARv. L. REv. 793
(1978) (although she assumes that test takers constitute a random sample in most situations.
Id. at 801 n.38).
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ferences in scores between minority and majority test takers is large
enough to reject the hypothesis that the difference stemmed from
chance. Plaintiffs would introduce tests of statistical significance along
with their data showing the degree of disparity in performance between
the two groups. If they failed to do so, the defendant could rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case by introducing its own test of statistical sig-
nificance showing that the between-group difference was too small to
preclude the possibility that it resulted from chance. Or, the defendant
could argue that the number of observations was too small to be statis-
tically reliable.140
The validity of statistical testing to assess whether differences in
outcome are real or simply reflect chance has been debated exten-
sively.141 Because a paticular group of test takers rarely constitutes a
random sample of all potential test takers, it is usually meaningless to
ask whether the observed differences reflect the random error resulting
from sampling. 142 In some instances, however, the difference could re-
flect random measurement error in the test taking and scoring process.
Because statistical significance tests assess the probability that the re-
sults could have stemmed from any random process, they are appropri-
ate if random measurement error could account for group differences.
The defendant's best response to the plaintiff's evidence of adverse
impact is to show that the test is a valid measure of job performance.
The defendant would offer evidence showing either job relatedness,
usually a measure of association between test scores and job perform-
ance, or legitimate business concerns. Although the Uniform Guide-
140. Results of a test of statistical significance depend on both the magnitude of the
difference between samples and the sample size. With very large samples, even small differ-
ences may be statistically significant (i.e., very probably reflect real differences in the popula-
tion from which the samples are drawn). But when the samples are small, the difference
between samples must be very large to be statistically significant. See H. BLALOCK, supra
note 133, at 161-62. Defendants who challenge the plaintiffs statistics solely on the basis of
the sample size are implicitly questioning the statistical reliability of the difference without
supporting their argument with a formal statistical test. See e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v.
Educational Equity League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
141. E.g., D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 18, at 134-35, 316; articles cited supra note
22.
142. Random sampling error results from the fact that the statistics (e.g., mean, propor-
tion) for a particular random sample will rarely equal the true corresponding parameters for
the population from which the sample was drawn. According to the "law of large numbers,"
the larger the sample, the more likely that the value of a particular statistic will fall close to
the value of the corresponding population parameter. In the limiting case where the sample
size equals the population size, the sample statistic, of course, equals the population parame-
ter. If an infinite number of random samples were drawn, the mean of their individual
means or proportions would equal that of the population. H. BLALOCK, supra note 133, at
179-83.
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lines on Employee Selection Procedures describe statistical procedures
for proving job relatedness,143 it is not clear whether statistical evidence
is necessary to establish the business necessity justification.
144
Type of Disproportionality
Statistical evidence of any theoretical type of discrimination com-
pares the actual outcome for minority group members with the out-
come expected in the absence of the alleged discrimination. We speak
of disproportionality because proportions are typically used instead of
whole numbers because they are not influenced by group size. How-
ever, when the expected number of outcomes is small, the comparison
may be made in whole numbers. 145 In addition to presenting directly
this evidence of disparity, either party may challenge the inference to
be drawn from the disparity or argue that the other's statistical evi-
dence is of poor quality or simply irrelevant.
The effectiveness of disproportionality statistics used by plaintiffs
to establish a prima facie case depends at least in part on how the dis-
proportionality is presented. Disproportionality may be presented and
described in at least two ways: the first compares the proportion of the
minority group represented in some outcome to their proportion in the
population eligible for that outcome. We call this a measure of "dis-
proportional representation." The second method compares the pro-
portion of all minority group members affected by some rule to the
proportion of all majority group members similarly affected. We refer
to this as a measure of "disproportionate adverse effect."
The relevance of either expression of disproportionality varies de-
pending on the theory of discrimination. The choice of one expression
helps litigants and the courts focus on the appropriate, but often dis-
puted, population for comparison. Hence, a litigant's case may be
strengthened or weakened by the form in which the disproportionality
143. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295 (1978). The problems concerning the validation of testing re-
quirements have not been entirely resolved. For a general discussion of the issues, see John-
son, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody: The Aftermath of Griggs and the Death of Employee
Testing, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1239 (1976); Lerner, supra note 19; Note, The Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures- Compromises and Controversies, 28 CATH. U.L. Rv. 605
(1979); Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences under Title VII, 59 VA.
L. REV. 463 (1973).
144. See sources cited supra note 93. Of course, the plaintiff may question the quality
and reliability of the defendant's statistical evidence. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975), the plaintiff challenged the defendant's attempt to validate various hiring
and promotion procedures.
145. See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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is presented. These computations are illustrated in the Appendix.
14
Disproportional Representation
It is often appropriate to present evidence of discrimination in
terms of the rate of representation, selection, or rejection of minority
group members. This expression of disproportionality compares the
minority group members' actual experience to their proportion in the
population eligible for that outcome.147 The comparisons might be of
minority candidates elected compared to minority voters in a district,
minority children in predominantly minority schools to all minority
children of school age, women hired to female job applicants, or wo-
men on a jury to women in a jury venire. For example, in Alexander v.
Louisiana,148 a discrimination in jury selection case, the appropriate
comparison was the proportion of blacks on several panels (seven per-
cent) to the proportion of black residents over twenty-one years of age
in the country (twenty-one percent). 49
146. In mechanical terms the two expressions of disproportionality differ in the direction
one figures the percentages. As the Appendix illustrates, blacks constitute 75% (300/400) of
all those who are executed and are thus overrepresented relative to their proportion of those
sentenced to death for capital crimes (1000/1500 or 66.6%). Computing the percentages by
reading it down the table rather than across, one would conclude that capital punishment
has a disproportionate adverse effect on blacks, of whom 30% (300/1000) of those who are
sentenced are actually executed compared to only 20% (100/500) of whites who are sen-
tenced to death. Although one comparison may be intuitively preferable to the other in
certain situations, given the necessary data, either can be computed and used. However,
courts rarely have the data necessary to compute the more appropriate statistics, and thus
depend on the computations litigants offer.
147. The latter proportion constitutes the nondiscriminatory standard for comparison.
For example, in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), the propor-
tion of black teachers employed by the district (rm) was .018 whereas the proportion of black
teachers in the St. Louis area from which the district recruits (Rm) was .154, indicating a 13.6
percentage point difference and a ratio of .117, between their representation among those
selected and those in the pool, where rm = nm/n and Rm = Nm/N. (See infra Appendix for
verbal description of notation).
Thus, the measure of the degree of disproportionality can be computed in two ways: as
the difference between the proportions represented and the eligible or as their ratio. See
infra Appendix. Unfortunately, there is no necessary statistical relationship between these
two modes of calculation. Given the same proportions rm and Rm, one calculation may
suggest greater disproportionality when rm and Rm fall in certain ranges. For example,
when both rm and Rm are small, their ratio will suggest greater disproportionality. When
both are large, the difference will suggest greater disproportionality.
148. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
149. If the comparison is couched in terms of whole numbers rather than proportions,
the standard of nondiscriminatory behavior is the expected number that would occur if the
minority experienced that outcome in proportion to their distribution in the eligible popula-
tion. For example, in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 136 (1976), the plaintiffs argued
that if blacks could elect city councilmembers in proportion to their share of the city's regis-
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The definition of the appropriate comparison population is often
disputed. In Alexander, the proportion of blacks selected for jury serv-
ice could have been compared to the proportion of black registered vot-
ers (sixteen percent) or to the proportion of blacks returning the jury
commissioners' questionnaires (thirteen percent). Because all of the
comparison populations showed substantial disproportionality, 50 the
parties did not litigate the issue and the Court's choice was not crucial.
In contrast, the Supreme Court remanded the case in HazelwoodSchool
District v. United States15 1 for further evidence on and consideration of
whether the appropriate comparison population was school teachers in
suburban Hazelwood or in the St. Louis metropolitan area.' 52 The de-
termination of the comparison population is directly relevant because,
in general, the more broadly defined the population, the greater the
disproportionality. Further, all other things being equal, the greater
the disproportionality, the stronger the statistical evidence of discrimi-
nation and the less likely the disparity is due to chance.'
53
Disproportionate Adverse Effect
It is also appropriate to present evidence of discrimination in
terms of the relative adverse effect of some policy. In this expression of
disproportionality, the experience of majority group members provides
the nondiscriminatory standard against which the experience of minor-
tered voters, they would be able to choose 2.42 of the 7 councilmembers. However, propor-
tional representation has not been accepted as the nondiscriminatory standard for
comparison. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); L. TRIBE, supra note 102, at 756-61
(1978).
150. The differences in Alexander are 14% (21%-7%), 5% (21%-16%), and 8% (21%-13%).
How much disproportionality is sufficient to establish any type of discrimination claim is not
clear and it probably varies depending on the purpose of the statistics. See Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1137 (4th Cir.
1983); D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 18, at 26-50; 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION § 74.50 (1977); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RiCHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 21-22, 46-51 (1980).
151. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
152. Id at 311-13.
153. For example, the selection of the appropriate comparison group is often at issue in
employment cases in which the defendant will argue for the narrowest population: job ap-
plicants. However, as the Court noted in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977),
using actual applicants as the comparison group may be misleading if minority group mem-
bers are deterred from applying because they know or believe the employer discriminates
against minorities. Depending on the jobs in question, the Court may, as it did in Hazel-
wood, adopt the middle group between general population statistics and applicant flow sta-
tistics of the relevant labor market, narrowed with respect to job qualifications. See Shoben,
supra note 17, at 9-19.
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ity group members is compared. The relevant comparison is the pro-
portion of all minority group individuals who are adversely affected by
the procedure to the proportion of all majority group individuals simi-
larly affected. For example, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,5 a chal-
lenge to the validity of a high school diploma requirement, a
comparison of ineligible populations was suggested: eighty-eight per-
cent of black males in North Carolina failed to complete high school
compared to sixty-six percent of white males.
55
As discussed above,156 whether the proportion of minority and
majority group members adversely affected is determined by those po-
tentially rather than those actually affected is often disputed. For ex-
ample, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 57 involving Alabama's minimum
height and weight standards for prison guards, the plaintiffs evidence
that the standards would disqualify forty-one percent of the female
population while excluding less than one percent of the male popula-
tions was based on national data. The defendant argued that the evi-
dence of adverse effect should have been based on actual applicants or
on demographic data for Alabama. 158 In cases alleging disparate im-
pact (category V), the standard of comparison is obviously important
because the adverse effect of the rule is direct evidence of a violation.
In cases involving categories I through IV, the evidence of effect is cir-
154. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
155. These percentages were given as success or pass rates in Griggs. Id at 430 n.6.
Comparisons in other cases can be derived by the following: P (majority population ad-
versely affected--66%) = n./N. and Pm (minority population adversely affected-88%) =
nm/Nm where N = males m Aorth Carolina and n = male non-high school graduates in
North Carolina (also see verbal description of notation infra in Appendix). If one expresses
the comparison in terms of success, rather than failure rates, n would equal all male high
school graduates in North Carolina.
Again, the two proportions may be compared by means of the difference between their
magnitudes (here, P. - P = 22%) or by a ratio (here, .75). The same difficulties we de-
scribed regarding the method of comparison for disproportional representation, supra note
147, apply here as well.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 128-43.
157. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
158. Id at 330. In addition to questions about long-term effect rather than processes of
chance, see supra notes 137-42, the particular population in the denominator of the n)/N
and nm/Nm ratios (in Griggs, white and black males in North Carolina; in Dothard, male
and females in the United States) may be at issue for the same reasons described supra in
note 153. Here, however, the narrower the population definition, the smaller the denomina-
tor in the ratios, and hence the smaller the measure of disproportionality. If the ratio of the
sizes of the majority and minority groups is not constant across different potential denomi-
nators (ie., (a) persons over age 16 and eligible for labor force participation, (b) persons
actually in the labor force, (c) persons qualified for the specific job in question, and
(d) actual job applicants), then selection of a population will influence the extent the statis-
tics indicate disproportionate adverse effect.
January 1983)
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cumstantial, but the standard of comparison may alter the magnitude
of the disparity. If so, then the plausibility of alternative explanations
negating intentional discrimination will be affected. As we suggest in
our discussion of statistical evidence, the purpose of the evidence
should determine the relevant comparisons.
Typically, disproportionate adverse effect claims describe the ef-
fect of a policy on members of both the majority group and minority
groups, but some policies adversely affect only minority group mem-.
bers. If so, the expression of disproportionality does not require an
explicit comparison of majority and minority group member's exper-
iences; showing that the policy only affects a minority is sufficient.
59
For example, in General Electric v. Gilbert ,160 the medical plan exclud-
ing pregnancy-related disabilities of employees affected some female
employees but had no effect on male employees.1 61 Such evidence that
the harm is borne solely by minority group members may indicate
either impermissible motivation or that the minority and majority are
not similarly situated.'
62
Cases Combining Both Types of Disproportionality
Although one expression of disproportionality may more typically
be used to prove a particular theory of discrimination, either may sup-
port any theoretical type of discrimination and cases may include both
types of evidence of statistical disproportionality. Statistical evidence
in impact cases typically involves disproportionate adverse effect com-
parisons, but may also show that the policy leads to underrepresenta-
tion of minority group members. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,' 63 the
plaintiff introduced evidence showing not only that the height and
weight minimum standards excluded a disproportionate number of wo-
men, but also that women were underrepresented among Alabama's
prison guards relative to their proportion in the total labor force. 164
Failure to employ the appropriate measure of disproportionality
159. In terms of the Appendix, Pj (Majority population adversely affected) = 0.
160. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
161. However, if the question were whether any pregnancy was covered under the plan,
including those of male employees' wives, then evidence of disproportionality would follow
the typical expression supra note 154.
162. For example, an employment rule that prohibits beards cannot affect women. See
Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualocation, 55 TEx.
L. REv. 1025, 1039-42 (1977).
163. 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977).
164. Similarly, in Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), women
were shown to be underrepresented in higher civil service positions, although the primary
evidence showed only the disproportionate adverse effect of the veterans' preference.rule.
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may obscure the legal issues or the probative value of the evidence.
For example, in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 65 the
plaintiffs claimed that the agency's rule against hiring people who were
in methodone maintenance programs disproportionately harmed
blacks and Hispanics because they were overrepresented in such pro-
grams. Direct evidence of the plaintiffs' allegation would be a compar-
ison of the proportions of blacks, Hispanics, and Anglos disqualified.
But instead, the plaintiffs used statistics comparing the proportions of
blacks and Hispanics in such programs with their proportion in the
relevant labor market, providing only tangential support for their claim
of disparate impact. When the evidence of disproportionality is in the
wrong form because it is directed to the wrong comparison, as in this
case, the courts may require a greater degree of disproportionality 66 to
establish a prima facie case or at least additional evidence to link the
operation of the rule with the less direct comparison.
Conclusion
The judicial system both responds to and helps shape national val-
ues. What courts find to be discriminatory often affects what the public
thinks of as discrimination. Thus, the implications of what constitutes
legal proof of discrimination extend beyond the courtroom. Judicial
decisions ultimately influence what legislators, scholars, and members
of minority and majority groups perceive as impermissible behavior by
providing or withholding institutional validation regarding what acts
are discriminatory and what evidence is probative.
Our theoretical classification scheme is not simply a useful way to
think about statistical evidence in discrimination cases. There are sev-
eral reasons for distinguishing among these five types of discrimination.
In addition to the usefulness of statistics, theoretical differences exist
among the various types and the resulting legal consequences. More-
over, there are policy reasons for regarding these as five distinct types.
Stated generally, the question is how far to intervene in private affairs
or to restrict states in order to end discrimination. The policy distinc-
tion between cases of disparate impact (category V) and all others is
between imposing affirmative obligations to protect minorities from in-
equality and imposing an obligation merely not to injure. This distinc-
tion reflects the philosophical debate between those who define
discrimination in terms of disproportionate outcome and affirmative
165. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
166. See supra sources cited at note 150.
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action and those who advocate a color-gender blind approach.167 The
policy distinction between cases involving discretion (category IV) and
other forms of intentional discrimination (categories I, II, III) concerns
how far the government should go in stamping out discrimination at
the cost of individual choice. The law's willingness to permit discre-
tionary decisions that cannot be justified by legitimately defensible dif-
ferences suggests that the policy choice is to eliminate only some forms
of discrimination.
The differences between facial discrimination (category I) and pre-
text and application cases (categories II, III) is one of form over sub-
stance. Because pretext and application cases are often more difficult
to rebut than cases of facial discrimination, the chosen policy rejects
the form over substance distinction. That is, a policy will not be treated
as nondiscriminatory simply because the defendant used a proxy for
overt discrimination. Finally, the difference between pretext cases and
application cases is the difference between questioning the honesty of
the legislative-democratic process itself and merely questioning
whether the relevant law enforcers have followed directions properly.
Whatever the outcome of such policy questions, the nature of the inter-
ests to be balanced is clear: the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments and the various civil rights statutes are designed to im-
prove the situation of minority group members. This goal must be
weighed against the practical and symbolic burdens of intruding into
individual and governmental autonomy.
Ultimately both the law and the public benefit from elaborating
the theoretical and operational definitions of discrimination. The cas-
ual commentator, for example, might interpret Justice Powell's disposi-
tive opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 168 as
espousing the unprincipled position that discrimination against whites
ought to be practiced by concealing the evidence of what actually oc-
curs. 169 If this charge were true, Justice Powell's opinion would obvi-
ously threaten the foundations of the rule of law itself. As we
conceptualize that opinion, however, the point is that as a policy matter
discrimination against whites falling into categories I, II, and III is un-
acceptable. Category IV-the use of hard-to-articulate but factually
disproportionate criteria-is permissible when its victims are members
of the group claiming discretion and choosing not to articulate the basis
167. The two views are expressed in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See also
supra note 8.
168. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
169. Id at 315-19.
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of its decisionmaking. Failure to distinguish disparate application (cat-
egory III) from discretion (category IV) may lead one to misunderstand
Justice Powell's position. He may be wrong, but he is neither confused
nor dishonest.
Similarly, the Court in New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer 170 should not be perceived as retreating from its previous nar-
row interpretation of business necessity to justify discrimination nor
from its close examination of rules adversely affecting minorities.
Rather, the ruling in Beazer reflects the Court's recognition that in
cases of disparate impact (category V) where statistics are the prima
facie case, they must be especially probative. When rules are racially
neutral in concept and implementation, statistics merely suggesting dis-
criminatory impact and not based on the best population or compari-
son are insufficient. The Court need not make the required evidentiary
jump from poor statistics to infer adverse impact and should be more
willing to accept the proffered justification in light of the impact
proven.
Detailing the standards of proof employed by courts in discrimina-
tion claims reduces the gap between abstract conceptualization and dis-
crimination as it is given effect by the institutions empowered to deal
with it. Policy judgments and legal analysis both stand to profit from
this task. Elaborating a theoretical classification and identifying how
statistics are appropriately used have practical value for members of
the legal and judicial communities, administrative agencies, policy-
makers, and litigants. We believe that our suggested distinctions in the
five conceptions of discrimination will aid litigants in obtaining appro-
priate evidence. From the standpoint of discrimination theory, these
distinctions should lead to a more realistic consideration of the rele-
vance of differences in outcome as well as treatment.
170. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
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EXECUTION OF THOSE SENTENCED TO DEATH BY RACE
Customs Black (m) White (j) Total
Executed 300 100 400
Not Executed 700 400 1100
Total 1000 500 1500
Disproportional Representation Statisticsa
Rm = Nm/N = 1000/1500 = 66.6%
r= nm/n = 300/400 = 75%
Rm - rm 8.4%
rm/R = 75/66.6
Disproportionate Adverse Effect Statisticsb
pm nm/N. = 300/1000 = 30%
Pj nj/Nj = 100500= 20%
P- Pj = 10%
Pj/Pm = 20/30; Pm/P = 30/20c
a. This measure of disproportional representation indicates that blacks are overrepresented
among those who are sentenced to death (75%) relative to their representation among
those convicted of capital offenses (66.6%). (Note that R, and r, could also be computed
for whites who would be underrepresented to the same degree that blacks are over-
represented. Hence, this comparison is redundant.) One can express the degree of
blacks' overrepresentation either as the difference of 8.4 percentage points or as a ratio
in which blacks are overrepresented among those sentenced to death by a ratio of nine
to eight (75/66.6).
b. This measure of disproportionate adverse effect indicates that the death penalty fals dis-
proportionately on black defendants who face higher probabilities of being sentenced to
die, given conviction of a capital crime. One can express the disparity as a difference of
10 percentage points or as a ratio in which white convicted defendants are two-thirds
(20/30) as likely as blacks to have the death sentence imposed or, blacks are half again
as likely, if one puts the proportion for blacks in the numerator (30/20).
c. Note that although both types of statistics are based on the same data, the values of the
differences and ratios of disproportionality are not equal.
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